![]() |
Hong Kong Law Reform Commission |
2.1 In this chapter, we explain the expression "contracts for the
supply of goods". The first part examines "contracts for supply" while the
expression "goods" will be discussed in the second part. In particular, we
examine three types of contracts for supply, namely, contracts for transfer of
property in goods, contracts of hire and contracts of hire purchase. For each
of these three types of contracts, we discuss the elements involved, types of
transactions not covered, the legislative treatment of each type in other
jurisdictions and the respondents’ comments on the Consultation Paper. We
then propose definitions for each type of contract in Recommendations 2, 3
and 4 respectively.
2.2 We then examine the appropriateness of the
definitions of "goods" in Cap 26, and the legislation in other jurisdictions.
We suggest that the definition of "goods" in Cap 26 should be followed in
Recommendation 5.
2.3 As computers have now become so commonly
used and influential in everyday life, we address the issue whether computer
software is "goods". We examine the relevant cases in various jurisdictions and
the feedback from the public on this issue, and conclude that it is
preferable to await a more comprehensive study of this topic and make no
recommendation accordingly. In this respect, our concern is limited to the
implied terms for contracts for the supply of computer software only. Issues
such as licensing and copyright are beyond the terms of reference of this Report
and may have to be separately dealt with.
2.4 A contract of sale is defined in section 3(1) of Cap 26
as:
"... a contract whereby the seller transfers or agrees to transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a money consideration, called the price. There may be a contract of sale between one part owner and another."
2.5 As a contract for the sale of goods is defined to require
both the transfer of title and the provision of money consideration, where
either element is missing, the contract is not a contract of sale but may be
called a "contract for the supply of goods". A contract for the supply of goods
may thus be generally understood as a contract whereby a supplier transfers
either possession or ownership of goods to another person for a consideration
which may or may not include money.
2.6 Where goods are supplied under a contract but the consideration
for the contract is not wholly found in the price of the goods, the contract is
not a sale. An example of this type of contract is a contract of barter. As
discussed later, at common law, a contract of sale of goods is distinguished
from a contract for work and materials.
2.7 Contracts which involve money
consideration but do not involve the transfer of title in goods are not
contracts for the sale of goods. Examples are contracts for the hire of goods
and contracts of hire purchase. Under a contract for the hire of goods or a
contract of hire purchase, title to the goods does not pass. Only possession of
the goods passes.
2.8 Contracts of barter, contracts for work and
materials, contracts of hire and contracts of hire purchase are therefore
outside the definition of contracts of sale. Cap 26 does not govern these
contracts. In Hong Kong, they are governed by the common law so far as the
implied obligations of the suppliers under these contracts are
concerned.[29]
2.9 Where
goods are transferred for no consideration, the transfer is a gift and not
contractual in nature. In referring to contracts for the supply of goods, the
Consultation Paper excluded non-contractual transactions (such as gifts) and
contracts concerning things other than movable property (such as land and choses
in action). Professor Hugh Beale, however, wonders whether it would be useful
to cover gifts when they are made in the course of a business so as to avoid the
kind of artificiality which may be involved in finding consideration in these
transactions. We understand the concern about the difficulties and sometimes
artificiality surrounding the concept of consideration in the law of contract.
We do not however consider it appropriate to recommend piecemeal changes to the
long-established requirement for the existence of consideration before a
transaction is regarded as contractual in nature. If the so-called "gifts"
supplied in the course of a business are supported by consideration, the
transaction will be covered by the Recommended Legislation. If however there is
an absence of consideration, it is not easy to justify why the implied
obligations should be imposed on a "supplier" making a true gift even if it is
made in the course of a business.
2.10 In this Report, we will consider three types of contracts for the
supply of goods:
2.11 The term "contracts for the transfer of property in goods" by
itself means any contract under which a person transfers or agrees to transfer
to another the property in goods. This covers various types of contracts, for
example, sale of goods, work and materials, barter, hire purchase, etc.
2.12 Contracts for the transfer of property in goods for the present
discussion should cover contracts under which property in goods is transferred,
whether or not services are also provided (for example, contract for work and
materials). Since property in goods is transferred, there should be protection
by the same statutory implied terms as in a sale of goods contract, even though
services are also supplied. In addition, while consideration other than by the
presumption by deed is a prerequisite, the nature of the consideration should
not matter for a contract to be a contract for the transfer of property in
goods. An example of such a contract is one to exchange goods for goods, ie
barter.
2.13 As Cap 26 already regulates contracts for the sale of goods, the
present discussion about contracts for the transfer of property in goods does
not cover sale of goods. As hire purchase involves hire, with the possibility
of later sale, it will be discussed under a separate heading.
2.14 In
referring to contracts for the supply of goods, we are excluding non-contractual
transactions such as gifts. A transaction which is made by a deed (and for
which there is no consideration apart from that presumed by a deed) should also
be excluded since it is more akin to a gift than to supply of goods, although
strictly contractual.
2.15 According to section 62(4) of Cap 26,
contracts operating by way of mortgage, pledge, charge or other security are
specifically excluded from the protection of Cap 26. For example, under a legal
mortgage of goods, the property in goods is transferred to secure a debt, but
the mortgagor often retains possession of the goods subject to the mortgagee's
power to take possession of the goods if the mortgagor defaults on repayment.
The mortgagee is not protected under Cap 26. By the same token, contracts
for the transfer of property in goods for the present discussion should exclude
contracts operating by way of mortgage, pledge, charge or other
security.
2.16 There are two major types of contracts for the transfer of
property in goods:
2.17 Under section 3 of Cap 26, the consideration for the transfer of
property in contracts of sale must be money, the price. Barter is usually
understood to mean the trading of goods for other goods without fixing the
price. Barter can also refer to the supply of goods in return for services, or
for both goods and services. Barter arises when goods (or services or other
equivalent[30]) are specifically
traded for goods of another. The parties themselves can agree that the
transaction (what might have been barter) takes the form of reciprocal sales,
with a mutual set-off of prices and a cash adjustment (if necessary). For
instance, goods "for a price to be satisfied by" other goods would be regarded
as reciprocal sales, while goods passed "in consideration of" other goods would
be regarded as
barter.[31]
2.18 Goods are
sometimes supplied under a transaction loosely known as "trading in" or "part
exchange". This mode of supply of goods is well established and quite common in
the motor trade. Goods are supplied in return for some other, usually less
valuable, goods, together with the payment of a sum of money. A price is
usually fixed for the more valuable goods. A value is then put on the goods to
be traded-in. The sum of money represents the difference in value of the
exchanged goods. The nature of "trading in" depends on how the facts of each
case are interpreted.[32]
2.19 At common law, a contract of sale of goods is distinguished from
a contract for work and materials. The general rule deducible from the cases in
which the distinctions were drawn seems to be that if the main object of the
contract is the transfer from A to B, for a price, of the property in a thing in
which B has no previous property, then the contract is a contract of sale. But
if the real substance of the contract is the performance of work by A for B, it
is a contract for work and materials even though the performance of the work
necessitates the use of certain materials and the property in those materials
passes from A to B under the
contract.[33] In the latter case,
the passing of goods is only ancillary to the supply of the services contracted
for.
2.20 As a result of the distinction, certain contracts of
supply[34] have been held to be
contracts of sale; whereas other contracts of
supply[35] have been held to be
contracts for work and materials. Other examples of contracts for work and
materials include contracts to repair a
car,[36] apply a
hair-dye[37] and roof a
house.[38]
2.21 Some retailers, such as supermarkets, give stamps, coupons or
vouchers upon purchase of goods by customers to promote sales or particular
products. Sometimes goods are offered in return for stamps or coupons without
the payment of money, and on other occasions goods are offered for a reduced
price on the surrender of stamps or coupons which a customer is allowed to trade
in as part of the consideration.[39]
Goods may also be supplied as a bonus to which a customer becomes entitled on
purchasing a certain quantity of the products which are being promoted and in
some circumstances the transaction merely involves a free
gift.[40]
2.22 Sometimes
there is a contract for the supply of goods in return for coupons or labels with
or without payment in addition; the contract is either a sale or barter but the
distinction is not always clear. For example, in Chappell & Co Ltd v
Nestle Co Ltd,[41] the
defendants offered a gramophone record to members of the public for a sum of
money together with the tender of three of their chocolate wrappers. The nature
of the transaction was not in issue in the case but one of the law lords thought
that the transaction was not a
sale.[42]
2.23 The case of
Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and
Excise[43] illustrates the
difficulties of distinguishing whether a transaction is a gift, a sale or
barter. Esso had a petrol sales promotion scheme. Under the scheme, coins were
distributed to petrol stations. The petrol station proprietor offered to give
away a coin for every four gallons of Esso petrol bought. The issue was whether
the coins were being "sold" and were accordingly chargeable to purchase tax.
The House of Lords was divided[44]
as to whether the scheme was a gift, collateral contract or
sale.
2.24 The importance of distinguishing a gift from a sale or barter
is that a person who receives a gift is not protected by the statutory implied
terms in the sale of goods legislation. As discussed in the following chapters,
the position of barter is uncertain, although terms implied in contracts of sale
may be followed.
2.25 Promotion tactics such as those referred to in the
previous paragraphs are common in the Hong Kong retail trade. In these
transactions there is a transfer of property in goods. It is the substance of
the transaction which determines its nature: whether it is a gift, a sale, a
collateral contract or barter. In this Report, these promotion tactics are
included as contracts for the transfer of property in goods if they are not
regarded as sales or gifts.
2.26 In Australia, the 1974 Act, which stipulates implied terms for
contracts for the supply of goods, does not define the scope of contracts for
the transfer of property in goods. Instead, it provides in section 4 that:
"supply ... includes ... in relation to goods - supply (including re-supply) by way of sale, exchange, lease, hire or hire purchase"
2.27 Even
though it is an inclusive definition, it is not clear whether some types of
contract for the transfer of property in goods (for example, the promotion
tactics used in retail trade) are covered by the 1974 Act. Contracts for work
and materials are covered by section 74 which provides separately some implied
warranties for this type of contract. As contracts for work and materials and
other types of contract for the transfer of property in goods are common in Hong
Kong, it would be sensible for the Recommended Legislation to cover them
expressly.
2.28 In New Zealand, the 1993 Act, which regulates implied terms for
contracts for the supply of goods, does not define the scope of contracts for
the transfer of property in goods. Instead, it provides in section 2 that:
"supply ... in relation to goods, means supply (or resupply) by way of gift, sale, exchange, lease, hire or hire purchase"
2.29 Unlike
its Australian counterpart, this is an exhaustive definition and includes supply
by way of gift. Section 15 of the 1993 Act provides that the guarantees in the
Act apply whether or not the goods are supplied in connection with a service,
and contracts for work and materials are therefore also covered.
2.30 In the 1982 Act, the scope of contracts for the transfer of
property in goods is defined in section 1 as follows:
"(1) In this Act in its application to England and Wales and Northern Ireland a 'contract for the transfer of goods' means a contract under which one person transfers or agrees to transfer to another the property in goods, other than an excepted contract.
(2) For the purposes of this section an excepted contract means any of the following –
(a) a contract of sale of goods;
(b) a hire-purchase agreement;
(c) a contract under which the property in goods is (or is to be) transferred in exchange for trading stamps on their redemption;
(d) a transfer or agreement to transfer which is made by deed and for which there is no consideration other than the presumed consideration imported by the deed;
(e) a contract intended to operate by way of mortgage, pledge, charge or other security.
(3) For the purposes of this Act in its application to England and Wales and Northern Ireland a contract is a contract for the transfer of goods whether or not services are also provided or to be provided under the contract, and (subject to subsection (2) above) whatever is the nature of the consideration for the transfer or agreement to transfer."
2.31 The
definition in section 1 is wide. Professor N E Palmer makes the following
comments about the scope of the
definition:[45]
"Sections 1 to 5 affect many different transactions, ranging from contracts of work and materials and exchange to the numerous innominate contracts whereunder a party transfers (or agrees to transfer) his property in goods to another. An obvious example of this residual category is the supply of 'free gifts' or 'bargain offers' which are obtainable by some prescribed act on the part of the prospective transferee, such as the despatch of a coupon or label or the entry into an associated contract with the supplier or a trading acquaintance."
2.32 The expression "contracts for the transfer of goods" is widely
defined in the 1982 Act and means a contract under which there is a transfer of
property in goods. This includes barter and contracts for work and materials.
Professor Palmer has pointed out that the definition covers any contract
"whereunder a party transfers (or agrees to transfer) his property in goods
to another", other than an excepted
contract.[46] This was deliberate,
according to the England & Wales Law Commission
Report[47] which was the catalyst
for the 1982 Act, in order to cover all types of contracts under which property
in goods is transferred.[48]
Section 1 of the 1982 Act is in line with our thinking as to what the scope of
contracts for the transfer of property in goods in Hong Kong should be.
Professor Palmer has commented that "sections 1 to 5 constitute a valuable
reform ... and the clarity which they afford to orthodox supply transactions is
unquestionably
beneficial."[49]
2.33 Although
contracts of barter and for work and materials are the two major types of
contracts for the transfer of property in goods, our concern is about contracts
for the transfer of property in goods in general. Apart from contracts of
barter and for work and materials, other types of transactions under which
property in goods is transferred (for example, promotional tactics used by the
retail trade: barter or collateral contracts) should also be covered under this
category. The Consultation Paper recommended that the definition of a "contract
for the transfer of property in goods" should be modelled on section 1 of the
1982 Act but should not, as in its subsection (2)(c), exclude contracts under
which the property in goods was or was to be transferred in exchange for trading
stamps on their redemption. The effect will be that, the proposed definition
will cover such contracts.
2.34 The Hong Kong Bar Association agrees with
the Consultation Paper that the proposed definition should cover such contracts.
But for the following reasons, it has reservations as to whether simply not
adopting section 1(2)(c) of the 1982 Act as one of the "excepted contracts" will
be sufficient to achieve this purpose:
(a) before an agreement can in law be a contract for the transfer of property in goods, it has to be supported by consideration. A non-contractual transaction such as a gift is not a contract since there is no consideration;
(b) transactions involving transfer of property in exchange for trading stamps on their redemption often raise the difficult question of whether they are simply gifts (because of the lack of consideration) or collateral contracts. The cases of "Chappell & Co Ltd" and "Esso Petroleum Co Ltd" discussed above are good examples of how uncertain the law in this area can be;
(c) thus, simply adopting the definition in section 1 of the 1982 Act without including the "excepted contract" in section 1(2)(c) will not resolve the uncertainty.
In
England the supply of goods on redemption of trading stamps is governed by the
Trading Stamps Act 1964. Section 4 of the 1964 Act sets out the obligations to
be implied when goods are given on redemption of trading stamps, and there is no
equivalent provision in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Bar Association observes that
since trading stamps, coupons or similar devices are commonly used by retailers
in Hong Kong as promotional tactics, there should be specific statutory
provisions dealing with transfer of property in goods in exchange for trading
stamps in the Recommended Legislation so as to avoid any potential
loophole.
2.35 We note that the nature of the initial giving away of
stamps, coupons or vouchers by suppliers to customers depends on how the
transaction is structured. It may amount to a gift, sale or collateral
contract. The first problem is that if it is held to be a gift, it would be
difficult to justify (at least conceptually) why the supplier’s statutory
implied obligations should apply to the subsequent supply of goods in exchange
for trading stamps. This is because, as pointed out earlier, the proposed
implied obligations should not apply to non-contractual supply of goods not
supported by consideration (ie a gift). Secondly, having specific provisions in
the Recommended Legislation on transfer of property in goods in exchange for
trading stamps as suggested by the Bar Association would imply that the initial
giving away of stamps, coupons or vouchers is contractual in nature (ie not a
gift). It would deprive the court of an opportunity to decide the true nature
of the transaction. We think it more sensible, however, to leave the courts to
decide the nature of the initial giving away of stamps, coupons or vouchers by
suppliers to customers.
2.36 Some retailers may also supply additional
goods directly as a "bonus" to customers for purchasing a certain quantity of
the promotion products, without involving stamps, coupons or vouchers. The
Esso case illustrates this. Esso had a petrol sales promotion scheme
under which customers would be given a World Cup coin for every four gallons of
Esso petrol bought.[50] Even if
there are specific provisions on transfer of property in goods in exchange for
trading stamps as suggested by the Hong Kong Bar Association, the Recommended
Legislation will still not cover cases which do not involve stamps, coupons or
vouchers such as the Esso case. The recommendation in the Consultation
Paper, however, should cover such cases so long as they are not regarded as
sales or gifts. The promotion tactics discussed above (whether or not involving
trading stamps or similar devices) involve a transfer of property in goods. It
is the substance of a transaction which determines its nature (ie whether it is
a gift, sale, collateral contract or barter). In our opinion, this should be a
matter left to the courts to determine.
2.37 Another point worth
mentioning is that when the Trading Stamps Act was enacted in 1964, there was no
statutory implied term covering contracts for the transfer of property in goods
similar to those in the 1982 Act. This (among other reasons) may make the
enactment of the 1964 Act desirable. According to Hansard, there were
controversies raging over trading
stamps.[51] The 1964 Act regulates
generally the issue, use and redemption of trading stamps. The main mischief to
be tackled by the Act was the operation of the trade, and the suppliers’
statutory implied obligations appear to be largely incidental. We are not aware
of any such controversies over the use of trading stamps in Hong Kong. For the
reasons mentioned above, we conclude that the recommendation in the Consultation
Paper should remain intact.
|
Recommendation 2
We recommend that:
|
2.38 The law concerning contracts of hire is found partly in the law
of bailment and partly in the general law of contract. As to the law of
bailment, Holt C J identified six categories of bailment in Coggs v
Bernard:[53] deposit, gratuitous
loan, hire, pledge, delivery for carriage (or management or repair) for reward
and delivery for carriage (or management or repair) without recompense. All the
six categories involve the delivery of goods by one person, the bailor, to the
other, the bailee, without transferring title. However, only hire of goods
involves supply of goods by one person for the use and enjoyment of another.
Therefore, questions of merchantability of the goods and their fitness for use
should only arise under contracts of hire. A table containing the complaint
statistics is at Annex 4.
2.39 Professor Hugh Beale suggests that
"contracts of hire" can be defined to include gratuitous loans if they are made
in the course of a business so as to avoid the kind of artificiality which may
be involved in finding consideration in these transactions. Gratuitous loans
are not contractual in nature as they are without consideration. Even where a
gratuitous loan is made in the course of a business, it is still gratuitous in
nature. We find it hard to see why the implied obligations should be imposed on
the "supplier" in such circumstances. For the same reasons set out above under
the heading "Other types of supply of goods", we do not consider it appropriate
to recommend piecemeal changes to the long-established requirement for the
existence of consideration under our law of contract.
2.40 Under a contract of hire of goods, the property in the goods does
not pass under the contract to the bailee of the goods (that is, the hirer).
The property remains in the owner of the goods and he is the "lessor". Only the
right to possession, use and enjoyment of the goods pass when the goods are
transferred. This type of contract may be described as a "lease", "rental
agreement", "contract of hire" or the like. The present discussion focuses only
on contracts of hire but covers all such contracts by whatever description,
under which one party bails or agrees to bail goods to another party by way of
hire.
2.41 Money is the usual consideration for this type of contract. A
hirer can hire goods for a specific occasion in return for a single payment or
he can hire over longer periods for the payment of a rental payable daily,
weekly, monthly or yearly. Examples of the former type are the hiring of video
films, cars and clothing such as dinner jackets, and examples of the latter type
are the hiring of televisions, photocopying machines, plant and
machinery.
2.42 It is also possible to hire for a consideration other
than the payment of money. In Mowbray v
Merryweather[54] the plaintiffs
were stevedores and they contracted to unload the defendant's vessel on the
condition that the defendant would lend them all necessary cranes, chains and
other equipment. The stevedores were the "hirers" of the cranes, chains and
equipment though they paid nothing for the use of them; and the ship-owner was
the "supplier".
2.43 There are contracts under which services are rendered involving
the use of goods (such as a ship or a piece of machinery) but the goods remain
under the control of the person rendering the services (the ship-owner or the
owner of the machinery). As the possession of the goods in question is not
transferred, the contract is not treated as a contract of hire for the present
purposes. Where possession is transferred, it is treated as a contract of hire
for the purpose of the present discussion whether or not services are rendered
as well. In daily life, examples of contracts of hire with services provided
are the hire of telephones with the facility of making calls and the hire of
photocopying machines with servicing provided.
2.44 Contracts of hire
purchase are not merely contracts of hire since under a contract of hire
purchase, the hirer obtains an option to acquire the title of the goods later,
not just the possession, use and enjoyment of the goods. We will discuss hire
purchase agreements as a separate category later in this Report.
2.45 Contracts of hire are not defined in the 1974 Act and the 1993
Act, even though contracts of hire are covered under the definition of "supply"
in both Acts.
2.46 In the 1982 Act, the scope of contracts for the hire of goods is
defined in section 6:
"(1) In this Act in its application to England and Wales and Northern Ireland a 'contract for the hire of goods' means a contract under which one person bails or agrees to bail goods to another by way of hire, other than an excepted contract.
(2) For the purposes of this section an excepted contract means any of the following –
(a) a hire-purchase agreement;
(b) a contract under which goods are (or are to be) bailed in exchange for trading stamps on their redemption.
(3) For the purposes of this Act in its application to England and Wales and Northern Ireland a contract is a contract for the hire of goods whether or not services are also provided or to be provided under the contract, and (subject to subsection (2) above) whatever is the nature of the consideration for the bailment or agreement to bail by way of hire."
2.47 The
definition in section 6 is wide. Professor N E Palmer makes the following
comments about the
definition:[55]
"A broad definition of contracts of hire is given by section 6 .... The section further provides that the nature of the hirer's consideration is immaterial to the character of the contract as one of hire, .... The result could again be the inclusion ... of a much wider circle of transactions .... The list includes the bailment of furniture or appliances under a lease of furnished premises ...."
2.48 The Consultation Paper recommended that section 6 of the
1982 Act was a useful blueprint for the definition of "contracts of hire" in the
Recommended Legislation.[56] We
think that it would be inappropriate to limit in the Recommended Legislation the
consideration for a contract of hire to money, since at common law the nature of
the consideration is also immaterial. We received no specific comment on this
recommendation and we now adopt it accordingly.
|
Recommendation 3
We recommend that:
|
2.49 Because sellers are keen to do business, buyers are often
encouraged to acquire goods on credit rather than for cash. But one of the
risks of a seller who supplies goods on credit is the failure by the buyer to
pay. To overcome this problem, different sorts of financing and security
transactions have been devised. A type of transaction commonly used in the
supply of goods is a hire purchase agreement. It is commonly used in respect of
not only consumer goods, such as, electrical appliances, motor vehicles, etc,
but also commercial goods, such as, plant and machinery. Because of the
widespread use of hire purchase agreements, the Chinese General Chamber of
Commerce favours the inclusion of this type of agreement in the present
reform.
2.50 In reality, sellers of goods are often retailers and they
are not in the business of providing credit to customers. Retailers will sell
the goods selected by customers to finance companies which become owners of the
goods. The finance companies then enter into hire purchase agreements with the
customers to let the goods to them. Contracts between retailers and finance
companies are contracts of sale. Contracts between finance companies and hirers
are hire purchase agreements. Though finance companies are owners of the goods,
their functions are actually to provide finance. This type of arrangement is
commonly used in respect of motor vehicles. A table containing the complaint
statistics is at Annex 4.
2.51 A hire purchase agreement is a contract under which goods are
bailed to the hirer in consideration for the hire-rent paid by the hirer. It
differs from a contract of hire in that a hirer under a hire purchase agreement
is also given an option to purchase the goods within the hire
period.[57] Sir Roy M Goode stated:
"[a] hire purchase agreement as known to common law may be defined as a
contract for the delivery of goods under which the hirer is granted an option to
purchase the goods".[58] It is
expected that a hirer will exercise the option, and the rate charged for the
hire will be calculated on the basis of the cash price of the goods plus
interest, and not on the market rate for hiring the goods. The House of Lords
held in Helby v Matthews[59]
that a hirer under a hire purchase agreement had no proprietary interest in the
goods hired until he had exercised his option to purchase and, as the hirer was
not a buyer in possession, a sale by the hirer before all the instalments had
been paid did not operate to transfer ownership to the sub-buyer.
2.52 The exercise of the option to purchase is important in the
context of hire purchase. Hire purchase agreements fall into the following two
classes:
"(a) agreements whereby the hirer takes the goods on hire for a stated rent and is given an option to purchase the goods at the end of the hiring on payment of an additional sum ('the option fee') which in practice is usually nominal; and
(b) agreements under which the price of the option to purchase is paid at the outset, or included in the hire-rent payable, so that the property in the goods passes automatically to the hirer on completion of the instalments stipulated, without the active exercise of any option to purchase."[60]
2.53 In
an agreement falling under the first category, the property in the goods does
not pass even at the end of the hire period unless the hirer exercises the
option by paying the option fee. If the option fee is other than purely
nominal, an agreement of this type is a true hire purchase agreement, even
though the hirer has no power to terminate the hiring before the expiration of
the period of hire.[61] But if the
option fee is only nominal, the position has not been clear until
recently.[62] It was held in
Close Asset Finance Ltd v Care Graphics Machinery
Ltd[63] that such an
agreement was a hire purchase agreement but not an agreement to buy since
"the hirers had not committed themselves to exercising the option or
committed themselves to take title to the [goods]".
2.54 An
agreement of the second category might be classified as a contract of sale or as
an agreement to sell unless the agreement contains a clause enabling the hirer
to terminate the hiring before the final instalment of rent becomes payable, for
otherwise, except by breaking the contract, the hirer cannot avoid ultimately
acquiring the title to the
goods.[64]
2.55 Both hire purchase and conditional sale may require payment of
the consideration by instalments. A conditional sale agreement is a contract of
sale[65] under which the performance
of a party’s obligation is conditional upon a particular event. For
example, a seller’s obligation to transfer the property is conditional
upon the payment of the last instalment of the price. What distinguishes a
conditional sale agreement from a hire purchase agreement is that a buyer under
a conditional sale agreement does not have a right to terminate the agreement or
an option to buy. In other words, he is obliged to buy the goods.
2.56 It is the nature of the transaction that determines whether or not
an agreement amounts to hire purchase, irrespective of what the agreement may be
called. In Sun Hung Kai Credits Ltd v Szeto Yuk
Mei,[66] in deciding whether a
guarantee was valid, the court held that the purported hire purchase agreement
gave the hirer no right to terminate the agreement and no option to purchase.
The agreement was therefore a conditional sale.
2.57 The expression "hire purchase agreement" is not defined in the
1974 Act and the 1993 Act even though hire purchase agreements are covered under
the definitions of "supply" in both Acts.
2.58 In Australia, only
Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia retain their Hire-Purchase
Acts which contain definitions of "hire purchase agreement". The definitions in
the Hire-Purchase Acts in Queensland, Tasmania and
Victoria[67] are similar. They
define "hire purchase agreement" to include a letting of goods with an option to
purchase and an agreement for the purchase of goods by instalments. But it does
not include (a) any agreement whereby the property in goods passes at the time
of the agreement, or (b) any agreement under which the hirer or purchaser
engages in the trade or business of selling goods of the same nature or
description, or (c) any contract regulated by the relevant Credit Acts or
Consumer Credit Code.[68] This is
an expanded meaning of "hire purchase agreement".
2.59 In New Zealand,
"hire purchase agreement" is defined in the Hire Purchase Act 1971 (section 2)
to mean an agreement whereby goods are let or hired with an option to purchase,
or an agreement for the purchase of goods by instalment payments under which
possession is passed before the total amount payable has been paid. But it does
not include (a) any agreement made other than by retail, or (b) subject to the
deeming provisions,[69] under which
the property in the goods passes absolutely at the time of the agreement or upon
or at any time before delivery. The meaning of "hire purchase agreement" in the
Hire-Purchase Act 1971 was also expanded beyond the common law
meaning.
2.60 Section 15 of the 1973 Act, which sets out the implied terms for
hire purchase agreements, defines "hire purchase agreement" as:
"an agreement, other than a conditional sale agreement, under which –
(a) goods are bailed or (in Scotland) hired in return for periodical payments by the person to whom they are bailed or hired, and
(b) the property in the goods will pass to that person if the terms of the agreement are complied with and one or more of the following occurs –
(i) the exercise of an option to purchase by that person,
(ii) the doing of any other specified act by any party to the agreement,
(iii) the happening of any other specified event."
2.61 The
definition of "hire purchase agreement" in section 15 was added to the 1973 Act
by the Consumer Credit Act 1974, which contains an identical definition in
section 189(1). An academic has called this definition "an expanded and more
precise
definition".[70]
2.62 Sir Roy
M Goode has commented[71] that this
definition was wider in scope and covered agreements which had not been regarded
as hire purchase agreements before. An agreement is a hire purchase agreement
even if the event causing property to pass is not a voluntary act of the owner
or hirer but the happening of some other specified event.
2.63 In R v
R W Proffitt Ltd,[72] a rental
agreement provided that at the end of the hiring the hirer was given the option
of purchasing the goods subject to the enactment of the necessary legislation.
Jones J held in this case that the rental agreement did not fall within the
definition of hire purchase agreement in the Hire-Purchase Act 1938. However,
"the enactment of the necessary legislation" could be
regarded[73] as "the happening of
any other specified event" and the agreement between the parties would then be a
hire purchase agreement under the new definition in the 1973 Act.
2.64 The court has not had occasion to decide on the real nature of
the rental agreement in R v R W Proffitt Ltd. From the nature of the
rental agreement in that case, the court would probably classify it as a
conditional sale agreement, but not a rental agreement (even though it was so
named) since the property would pass subject to certain conditions. That
agreement would then be a contract of sale within the 1979 Act. The consequence
is that the "buyer in possession" exception to the nemo dat quod non habet
rule[74] (embodied in section
25(1) of the 1979 Act) would be applicable. The effect of section 25 is that a
buyer who is in possession of the goods may confer ownership on a bona fide
sub-buyer, even though the buyer himself has not yet acquired the property in
the goods. That is unfair to the seller under the first sale agreement, ie the
owner of the goods.
2.65 The expanded definition of hire purchase
agreement introduced by section 15 of the 1973 Act (as added by the Consumer
Credit Act 1974) will cover agreements similar to that in R v R W Proffitt
Ltd. Such agreements may then be treated as hire purchase agreements and
not conditional sales. The buyer in possession exception to the nemo dat
rule would then not apply and this should prevent unfairness to the owner of the
goods.
2.66 In Hong Kong, there is an equivalent buyer in possession
exception to the nemo dat rule embodied in section 27(2) of Cap 26. To
minimise unfairness to the owner of the goods, we believe that an expanded
definition of hire purchase agreement would also be appropriate for Hong
Kong.
2.67 In Sir Roy M Goode's view, "[t]he given elements in any
definition [of hire purchase] are:
(1) that goods are being hired
(2) that the property will pass to the hirer
but
(3) the hirer has a right not to go all the way, either because he has to exercise a positive option to buy or because he can terminate the hire agreement before incurring an obligation to pay the full price."[75]
2.68 As
to the first element mentioned above by Sir Roy Goode, hiring of goods, the
expanded definitions of hire purchase agreement in both Australia (Queensland,
Tasmania and Victoria) and New Zealand cover purchase of goods by instalment
payments, but not just hire of goods. The definition in the Hire-Purchase Act
1959 in Western Australia is even wider. As mentioned above, the deeming
provisions in section 2(5) and (6) in the Hire-Purchase Act 1971 in New Zealand
also cover some types of contracts of sale. Such expanded definitions with
scope wider than bailment of goods may be too drastic for Hong
Kong.
2.69 The definition in the 1973 Act is expanded but is still
confined to bailment. It is not limited to "the case where the bailee has an
option to purchase - any other contingent agreement, not being a conditional
sale agreement, whereby the property in goods may pass to the
bailee"[76] would be within the
UK definition. Sir Roy Goode is of the view that the definition in the 1973 Act
was drafted to be as comprehensive as
possible.[77] Professor Paul Dobson
stated[78] that the inclusion of
sub-paragraph (iii) in section 15 of the Act was "an anti-avoidance provision
in case anything which ought to be caught by the definition is not caught by (i)
or (ii)". After discussing with Professor Francis Bennion, the draftsman of
the Consumer Credit Act 1974, Professor Dobson further
stated:[79]
"the definition was drafted this way in order to capture a concept. That concept is one where goods are hired but where there is an additional element in the agreement, namely that property (not will, but) might pass to the hirer. That additional element is then one where property might pass to the hirer and where that passing of property depends upon a contingency. That contingency will often, of course, be the exercise by the hirer of an option. It might, however, be anything and subparagraph (iii) makes this clear .... It would also be accurate to describe such a hiring agreement as an agreement of hire where property in the hired goods might, depending on a contingency, pass to the hirer - ie they are agreements to hire with the chance that they will turn into methods of conveying property in the goods".
2.70 The second element, passing of property to the hirer, is
straightforward and requires little elaboration. The third element, a hirer's
right but not obligation to buy the goods, can be illustrated by the following
cases.
2.71 In Lee v
Butler,[80] the hirer agreed to
hire some furniture by paying rental in two instalments. On paying the second
instalment, the property would pass to the hirer. The court held that since the
"hirer" was bound to make that payment, the agreement in question was a contract
of sale. On the other hand, in Helby v
Matthews,[81] the hirer hired a
piano on the basis that he paid 36 instalments of rental and, on paying the last
instalment, the property of the piano would pass to him. In addition, the hirer
was free to terminate the agreement at any time. The House of Lords held that
the agreement in question was a hire purchase agreement since the hirer was not
bound to buy the piano. The English Court of Appeal in a recent case,
Forthright Finance Ltd v Carlyle Finance
Ltd,[82] held an agreement to be
a conditional sale agreement because the "hirer" was contractually obliged to
pay all the contractual instalments. In this case, the "hirer" could exercise
an option to decline to receive the title after paying all instalments. Despite
this, the Court of Appeal still held that it was a conditional sale agreement
because the "option not to take title, which one would only expect to be
exercised in the most unusual circumstances, [did] not affect the true nature of
the
agreement".[83]
2.72 Professor
Paul Dobson also stated, "[i]n a hire-purchase agreement, the debtor is not
committed to acquiring title to the
property".[84]
2.73 However,
it must be pointed out that paras (b)(ii) and (iii) of the definition in section
15 of the 1973 Act may not necessarily be in line with the important element of
hire purchase that a hirer has the right but not the obligation to buy the
goods. Paragraph (b)(ii) refers to "the doing of any other specified act by
any party to the agreement". "[A]ny party to the agreement" can be any
party other than the hirer, and the doing of the specified act by that party
will trigger the passing of the property. Whether that party does that
specified act or not may be beyond the control of the hirer. The same applies
to "the happening of any other specified event" of para (b)(iii), since the
happening of that specified event may be beyond the control of the hirer. The
happening of that specified event will also trigger the passing of the property.
Therefore, under some circumstances, the hirer may be obliged to buy the goods
because the "doing of the specified act" in para (b)(ii) or the "happening of
any other specified event" in para (b)(iii) may be beyond his control. Such a
scenario is practically indistinguishable from a conditional sale agreement
under which the buyer is obliged to buy the goods. Professor Francis Bennion,
however, has no doubt that the definition does not cover a conditional sale
agreement because it is expressly excluded. If an agreement is not a
conditional sale, it ought to be regarded as a hire-purchase agreement even
though the hirer has agreed to a term whereby he may lose
control.
2.74 It is true that the 1973 Act definition expressly excludes
conditional sale agreements. But under the 1973 Act the property of goods may
pass to a hirer because of "the doing of any other specified act" or the
"happening of any other specified event" which may be beyond his control or
desire. In such a case, he has an obligation, but not a right, to buy the
goods. It is in this sense that the agreement in question is similar to a
conditional sale agreement. Sir Roy Goode is of the view that the definition in
the 1973 Act was drafted "to cover all types of situation in which property
would pass where the hirer nevertheless had the right to prevent this
happening".[85] Even though he
stated that the important element of a hirer's right but not obligation to buy
the goods was "covered by saying that a hire purchase agreement is an
agreement 'other than a conditional sale agreement' [in the definition of the
1973 Act]",[86] it would be
appropriate for Hong Kong to spell out this important element explicitly for the
sake of certainty and the avoidance of doubt.
2.75 Section 15 of the 1973 Act defines a hire purchase agreement as
an agreement under which the property in the goods will pass "if the terms of
the agreement are complied with" and "one or more of the following occurs
...."[87] These two elements
overlap with each other. Sub-paras (i), (ii) and (iii) should already form part
of "the terms of the agreement". Once all the terms have been complied with,
there would by definition be no further terms requiring "the exercise of an
option", "the doing of any other specified act" or "the happening of any other
specified event" before property is to pass. Any such "further" terms would
already have been complied with.
2.76 Furthermore, Sir Roy Goode is of
the view that "the definition is
over-elaborate".[88] The definition
of "hire purchase agreement" in the 1973 Act is wider than that in the Hire
Purchase Act 1965 and, in effect, it avoids the operation of the buyer in
possession exception to the nemo dat rule, but yet is still confined to
the scope of bailment. Nonetheless, because of the reasons mentioned above, the
definition in the 1973 Act may not be appropriate for Hong Kong.
2.77 On the basis of the elements of a definition of "hire purchase
agreement" he identified, Sir Roy Goode suggested that:
"it would be sufficient to say that a hire purchase agreement is an agreement, or a combination of agreements, by which goods are supplied on hire and the hirer has the right, but not obligation to buy the goods."[89]
2.78 For
Hong Kong, a wider definition is preferred, but it should not be outside the
scope of bailment since the basis of hire purchase must be hire. In addition,
the important element that a hirer has the right, but not an obligation, to buy
the goods must be reflected unequivocally in the definition. The definition
should also be concise. To this end, the Consultation Paper recommended that
the definition suggested by Sir Roy M Goode, which included all the required
elements without compromising conciseness, was appropriate for Hong Kong.
2.79 Professor Francis Bennion prefers the 1973 Act definition which, in
his opinion, spells everything out clearly, and he further states that the
objections to it lack substance. He suggests that the term "a combination of
agreements" is otiose and may cause difficulties. He refers to the Consumer
Credit Act 1974 which speaks only of one agreement because under the
Interpretation Act 1978 the singular includes the plural. We agree that the
term "a combination of agreements" can be discarded.
2.80 Professor
Bennion further comments that Recommendation 4 in the Consultation Paper on
the definition of "hire purchase agreement" simply hinges on the meaning of the
term "hire", and there is also a question as to the meaning of the word
"supplied". We, however, note that the definitions in the 1965 Act and 1973 Act
use the word "bailment". We believe that either the concept of "hire" or
"bailment" is needed to convey the essence of the term "hire purchase
agreement". The word "hire" is more user-friendly, and the phrase "supplied on
hire" should create no problem. In the circumstances, we have decided to
retain the recommendation proposed in the Consultation Paper, subject to the
deletion of the term "a combination of agreements".
|
Recommendation 4
We recommend that:
(a) a hire purchase agreement should be treated in the Recommended
Legislation as a type of contract for the supply of goods; and
(b) it should be defined to mean an agreement by which goods are
supplied on hire and the hirer has the right but not an obligation to buy the
goods.
|
2.81 In section 2 of Cap 26, "goods" is defined as including:
"all chattels personal other than things in action and money. The term includes emblements, industrial growing crops, and things attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale".
2.82 This
is a general definition and makes it clear that "goods" includes "all chattels
personal other than things in action".
2.83 In section 4 of the 1974 Act, "goods" is defined to include
ships, aircraft, other vehicles, animals, minerals, trees, crops, gas and
electricity. This is an inclusive definition and the word "goods" is
"defined in terms based upon, but wider than, the definition in the sale of
goods legislation".[90]
Reference should therefore be made to the more general definition of "goods" in
the sale of goods legislation in each individual state or territory in
Australia. For example, in section 5(1) of the Sale of Goods Act (NSW), "goods"
is defined in identical terms to those in Hong Kong.
2.84 In section 2(1) of the 1993 Act, "goods" is defined to include
goods attached to or incorporated in real or personal property, ships, aircraft,
vehicles, animals, minerals, trees, crops, etc. This is also only an inclusive
definition, and reference should be drawn to the more general definition of
"goods" in the Sale of Goods Act 1908.
2.85 In section 18(1) of the 1982 Act, "goods" is defined as
follows:
"'goods' includes all personal chattels, other than things in action and money, and as regards Scotland all corporeal moveables; and in particular 'goods' includes emblements, industrial growing crops, and things attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before the transfer bailment or hire concerned or under the contract concerned".
2.86 This
definition is almost identical to that in the 1979 Act. "Goods" is not defined
in the 1973 Act and the definitions in the 1979 Act and the 1982 Act should be
followed.
2.87 The Consultation Paper recommended that, for the sake of clarity
and consistency with Cap 26, the more general definition of "goods" in Cap 26
should be adopted for other types of supply of goods, instead of the inclusive
definitions found in the 1974 Act (Australia) and the 1993 Act (New Zealand).
Professor Hugh Beale supports the proposal in the Consultation Paper and agrees
that it is sensible to have the same definition in the context both of sale of
goods and supply of goods. We so recommend.
2.88 In Hong Kong, computers are more and more commonly used both at
home and in business (including non-profit organisations such as government,
charitable groups, etc). However, it is not clear whether the definition of
"goods" in Cap 26 covers computer software and there is no Hong Kong authority
on this.
2.89 A physical copy of computer software is very often supplied
to a customer by way of sale. For the present purpose, we focus on the supply
of goods other than by way of sale. Computer software as the subject matter of
a contract of hire or hire purchase agreement is relatively uncommon. However,
computer software can be the subject matter of a contract for transfer of
property in goods as defined in this chapter, such as, contracts for work and
materials or other types of contracts for transfer of property in goods. The
cases cited in the following paragraphs mainly concern sales of computer
software. Nonetheless, since the emphasis of the following discussion is
whether computer software is "goods", the analysis should also be applicable to
the supply of goods other than sale.
2.90 Computer hardware is a tangible personal chattel and therefore
should be goods within the definition of "goods" in Cap 26.
2.91 As for a
computer system comprising both hardware and software, Toby Constructions
Products Pty Ltd v Computa Bar (Sales) Pty
Ltd,[92] an Australian case,
held that this was "goods" within the definition of the Sale of Goods Act 1923
(NSW) and the 1974 Act. In this case, the plaintiff acquired a complete
computer system comprising hardware and software and there were defects in the
computer system. The question was whether the computer system was "goods".
Rogers J held:
"Confronting the question specifically, I come to the conclusion that a sale of a computer system, comprising both hardware and software, as in the present case, does constitute a sale of goods within the meaning of both the [Trade Practices Act 1974] and the [Sale of Goods Act 1923 (NSW)]. There is a sale of tangible chattels, a transfer of identifiable physical property. It is true that it is necessary for the effective working of the system that there should be comprised within it software. That does not disqualify the aggregate operative system from the appellation or description of 'goods'."[93]
2.92 The
English Court of Appeal endorsed this decision in St Albans City and District
Council v International Computers
Ltd.[94] Sir Iain Glidewell
stated[95] (obiter) that
"that decision was in my respectful view clearly correct". In this case,
the plaintiff local authority entered into a contract with the defendant company
for the supply of a computer system and there was an error in the software. The
Court of Appeal held that there was an "express contractual obligation to
supply the plaintiffs with software which would enable them accurately to
complete the return by [a certain]
date"[96] and the defendant had
breached that express term.
2.93 Sir Iain Glidewell went on to express
his opinion as to whether, assuming that there was no such express term, a term
to the same effect (ie as to quality or fitness for purpose) would be implied
either by statute or general contract law. Sir Iain Glidewell first decided
whether such a term was implied by statute and said:
"In both the Sale of Goods Act 1979, s61, and the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982, s18, the definition of goods includes 'all personal chattels other than things in action and money'. Clearly, a disk is within this definition. Equally clearly, a program, of itself, is not ....
There is no English authority on this question, and indeed we have been referred to none from any common law jurisdiction ....
Suppose I buy an instruction manual on the maintenance and repair of a particular make of car. The instructions are wrong in an important respect. Anybody who follows them is likely to cause serious damage to the engine of his car. In my view, the instructions are an integral part of the manual. The manual including the instructions, whether in a book or a video cassette, would in my opinion be 'goods' within the meaning of the 1979 Act, and the defective instructions would result in a breach of the implied terms in s14.
If this is correct, I can see no logical reason why it should not also be correct in relation to a computer disk onto which a program designed and intended to instruct or enable a computer to achieve particular functions has been encoded. If the disk is sold or hired by the computer manufacturer, but the program is defective, in my opinion there would prima facie be a breach of the terms as to quality and fitness for purpose implied by the 1979 Act or the 1982 Act."[97] (emphasis added)
2.94 However,
in this case, an employee of the defendant went to the plaintiffs' premises,
taking with him a disk encoded with the required program, and transferred the
program into the computer. Since Sir Iain Glidewell was of the view that the
program itself was not "goods" within the terms of either the 1979 Act or the
1982 Act, the statutory implied terms in those acts did not apply to this case.
But he was of the opinion that a term as to fitness for purpose would be implied
under general contract law.
2.95 In the United States, the Court of
Appeals for the 3rd Circuit
held[98] that software in a physical
medium was "goods" within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code:
"Computer programs are the product of an intellectual process, but once implanted in a medium are widely distributed to computer owners. An analogy can be drawn to a compact disc recording of an orchestral rendition. The music is produced by the artistry of musicians and in itself is not a 'good', but when transferred to a laser-readable disc becomes a readily merchantable commodity. Similarly, when a professor delivers a lecture, it is not a good, but, when transcribed as a book, it becomes a good.
That a computer program may be copyrightable as intellectual property does not alter the fact that once in the form of a floppy disc or other medium, the program is tangible, moveable and available in the marketplace ....
The importance of software to the commercial world and the advantages to be gained by the uniformity inherent in the UCC are strong policy arguments favoring inclusion. The contrary arguments are not persuasive, and we hold that software is a 'good' within the definition in the Code."[99] (emphasis added)
2.96 Even
though the US Court of Appeals stated that "software [was] a 'good'", it is
clear from reading the passages quoted that the court meant software in a
physical medium.
2.97 With the possibility and growing popularity of
on-line distribution of informational products, the question as to whether
software supplied through the Internet is "goods" arises. It was held in ASX
Operations Pty Ltd and others v Pont Data Australia Pty
Ltd,[100] an Australian case,
that information supplied by electronic means was not "goods" for the purposes
of the 1974 Act. Judge Lockhart stated:
"it does not follow ... that it should be read as if there was a further inclusion, by way of extension of the ordinary meaning of 'goods', so as to draw within the definition encoded electrical signals".[101]
2.98 It should be safe to say that hardware is "goods". As for a
computer system comprising hardware and software (such as the boot-up, start-up
or operating system program stored on computer chips or a disk inside a
computer), it may be regarded as "goods" within Cap 26 since the hardware and
software can be considered as constituting one entity. The Toby case
referred to earlier provides authority for this.
2.99 The sale (supply)
of a floppy disc containing computer software is similar to a sale of a compact
disc containing recorded music or a videotape containing a movie. There is a
sale (supply) of a chattel embodied with a copy of "work" in which intellectual
property rights exist in each case. The fact that the "work" of which a copy is
sold (supplied) also constitutes intellectual property does not undermine the
fact that the physical medium containing the "work" is a chattel and, therefore,
"goods".[102] The view of Sir
Iain Glidewell in the St Albans case supports this. As to software
supplied through the Internet or other electronic means, it is more difficult to
argue that it falls within the definition of "goods" in Cap 26 since it is
not in a tangible medium.
2.100 None of the cases referred to are from
Hong Kong and the remarks in the St Albans case on the issue in question
are only obiter dicta. The position in Hong Kong therefore remains
uncertain. The Recommended Legislation could therefore define "goods" to make
it clear that computer systems comprising hardware and software and tangible
mediums containing software do not disqualify the systems and the mediums
respectively from being "goods". It should be noted that such a definition will
be different from that in Cap 26 and there will be inconsistency between the two
definitions. The definition in Cap 26 may then have to be amended
consequentially.
2.101 Another option would be to leave it to the courts
to decide. The advantages of this approach are that this is in line with
Australia, New Zealand and England and Wales and that there is no need to
consider whether to amend the definition of "goods" in Cap 26. However,
the disadvantage is that the issue remains unclear.
2.102 Computers are widely used for both domestic and business
purposes in Hong Kong, and affect many aspects of everyday life. Users of
software, whether consumers or not, should be protected just like users of any
other goods and should not have to put up with uncertainty. Certainty and
predictability in the law are important. Both the Democratic Alliance for the
Betterment of Hong Kong and the Judiciary Administrator’s Office note that
contracts for the sale or supply of Internet-related services and software
programmes have mushroomed, and consider that certainty and predictability of
the law can be enhanced if the definition of "goods" covers computer
software.
2.103 It is reasonable that users of software should be
protected in the same way as users of any other goods. However, expanding the
definition of "goods" so that it clearly covers computer systems incorporating
software, as well as a disk or other physical medium on which the software is
written, only addresses one aspect of software use. It may be preferable to
await a more comprehensive study of this topic, covering issues such as software
licensing and Internet
contracts.[103] Professor Hugh
Beale and the Consumer Council endorse the recommendation in the Consultation
Paper that extending the definition of "goods" to cover computer software should
be dealt with cautiously, even though both of them consider that the increasing
use of computers and the Internet warrants reform. In addition, as noted in the
Consultation Paper, according to the Consumer
Council,[104] the number of
complaints about software were not significant. A table containing the
complaint statistics on software is at Annex 5. The Judiciary
Administrator’s Office responds that the fact that the complaint
statistics are low may not accurately reflect the extent of commercial disputes
in relation to contracts of this nature. We agree that the complaint statistics
may not be conclusive, but they at least provide an objective means to assess
the situation. After considering the arguments, we have come to the conclusion
that a highly technical topic such as this deserves a separate study in its own
right. Piecemeal changes may not necessarily be to the benefit of software
users.
2.104 It must be pointed out that the discussion of the supply
of computer software in this Report is not intended to cover all matters
relating to computer software. Our concern is limited to the implied terms for
contracts for supply of computer software.
|
Recommendation 5
We recommend that the definition of "goods" in Cap 26 should be adopted
in the Recommended Legislation.
|
[29] The service element
under a contract for work and materials is governed by the Supply of Services
(Implied Terms) Ordinance (Cap
457).
[30] Benjamin's Sale of
Goods, 5th Ed, 1997, at para 1-037.
[31] Benjamin's Sale of Goods, 5th Ed, 1997, at para 1-037. In Aldridge v Johnson (1875) 7 EB 885, the parties agreed 32 bullocks should be transferred by Aldridge to Knights and 100 quarters of barley should be transferred by Knights to Aldridge, the difference to be paid in cash. It was held that there were mutual sales. Professor L Sealy is of the view that had the deal been that 100 quarters of barley be traded for 32 bullocks, or for 32 bullocks plus a sum of money, without any valuation of consideration on either side, it could only be regarded as barter (Benjamin's Sale of Goods, 5th Ed, 1997, at para 1-037).
[32] A deal can be regarded as reciprocal sale with a set-off of prices, or as one contract of sale, of the principal goods, together with a subsidiary arrangement that if the buyer delivers to the seller the other goods, an agreed allowance will be made. Benjamin's Sale of Goods, 5th Ed, 1997, at para 1-039.
[33] Michael Mark, Chalmers Sale of Goods, 18th Ed, 1981, at 80-81.
[34] For example, supplying a meal in a restaurant, Lockett v Charles [1938] 4 All ER 170; making and fitting false teeth, Lee v Griffin [1861] 30 LJ QB 252 cf Samuels v Davis [1943] KB 526; making mink jackets from skins selected by the customer, Marcel (Furriers) Ltd v Tapper [1953] 1 All ER 15; [1953] 1 WLR 49; providing and laying fitted carpets, Philip Head & Sons, Ltd v Showfronts, Ltd [1970] 1 Lloyd's Rep 140.
[35] For example, printing 500 copies of a treatise, where the printer supplies the paper, Clay v Yates [1856] 1 H & N 73; painting a portrait, Robinson v Graves [1935] 1 KB 579.
[36] G H Myers & Co v
Brent Cross Service Co [1934] 1 KB
46.
[37] Watson v Buckley,
Osborne, Garrett & Co Ltd [1940] 1 All ER
174.
[38] Young & Marten
Ltd v McManus Childs Ltd [1969] AC 454.
[39] In England, the supply of goods on redemption of trading stamps is governed by the Trading Stamps Act 1964.
[40] cf Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1976] 1 WLR 1.
[41] [1960] AC 87.
[42] In a Canadian case on similar facts, Buckley v Lever Bros Ltd [1953] 4 DLR 16, the Court treated the transaction as one of sale. See also the diverging views of the law lords in the Esso case below.
[43] [1976] 1 WLR 1.
[44] Lord Fraser thought there was a sale. Viscount Dilhorne and Lord Russell both thought that the Court of Appeal were right in holding that the coins were being distributed as gifts. Lord Simon and Lord Wilberforce, on the other hand, ruled that the supply of the coins to the motorists was contractual but without there being a sale; the consideration for the transfer of the coin or coins was not a money payment but the undertaking by the motorist to enter into a main contract to purchase the appropriate quantity of Esso petrol. Professor Atiyah has mentioned that if there were a collateral contract, "it would presumably be a contract for the transfer of goods within" the 1982 Act. P S Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, 10th Ed, 2001, at 11.
[45] N E Palmer, "The Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982", (1983) 46 MLR 619, at 620.
[46] N E Palmer, "The Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982", (1983) 46 MLR 619, at 620.
[47] Law Com No 95, at para 28.
[48] These include the promotional tactics used by the retail trade, for example, goods supplied for labels, wrappers, coupons or vouchers with or without money, so long as they are not regarded as gift or sale.
[49] N E Palmer, "The Supply of
Goods and Services Act 1982", (1983) 46 MLR 619, at
623.
[50] For the significance
of this case, please see the discussion earlier in this
chapter.
[51] Hansard HL, 8 June
1964, col 714.
[53] (1703) 2 Ld Raym 909; 92 ER 107.
[54] [1895] 2 QB 640.
[55] N E Palmer, "The Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982", (1983) 46 MLR 619, at 625.
[56] Section 6(2)(b) of the 1982 Act about trading stamp is not relevant to our discussion since there is no statute equivalent to the Trading Stamps Act 1964 in Hong Kong.
[57] A "hire purchase agreement"
was defined under s1 of the Hire-Purchase Act 1965 of UK as "an agreement for
the bailment of goods under which the bailee may buy the goods, or under which
the property in the goods will or may pass to the
bailee".
[58] R M Goode,
Hire-Purchase Law and Practice, 2nd Ed, 1970, at 32.
[59] [1895] AC
471.
[60] R M Goode,
Hire-Purchase Law and Practice, 2nd Ed, 1970, at
33.
[61] R M Goode,
Hire-Purchase Law and Practice, 2nd Ed, 1970, at 33.
[62] Sir Roy Goode has said that
in England this has never been decided, but in the United States and Australia,
the courts will treat the agreement as a conditional sale agreement. R M
Goode, Hire-Purchase Law and Practice, 2nd Ed, 1970, at
47.
[63] Times L R 21 March
2000.
[64] R M Goode,
Hire-Purchase Law and Practice, 2nd Ed, 1970, at
34.
[65] "A contract of sale
may be absolute or conditional". Section 3(2) of Cap 26.
[66] [1985] 1 HKC 345. Sun Hung Kai supplied a public light bus to a 'hirer' under an agreement which was expressed to be a hire purchase agreement. The hirer paid the first two instalments but then terminated the agreement, and Sun Hung Kai sued the hirer and the guarantor.
[67] The definition in section 2 of the Hire-Purchase Act 1959 Western Australia is much wider and includes –
"(a) a letting of goods with an option to purchase;
(b) any agreement under which there is a bailment of goods and either the bailee may buy the goods or the property in the goods will or may pass to the bailee;
(c) any agreement for the purchase of goods by instalments (whether the agreement describes the instalments as rent or hire or otherwise) if the vendor or any person other than the hirer or his guarantor retains any interest in the goods or is or may become entitled to repossess the goods or to cause the hirer to lose his property in the goods; and
(d) any agreement whereby the property in the goods comprised therein passes at the time of the agreement or upon or at any time before delivery of the goods, if the vendor or any person other than the hirer or his guarantor retains any interest in the goods or is or may become entitled to repossess the goods or to cause the hirer to lose his property in the goods."
[68] (QLD) Hire-Purchase Act 1959 s2; (TAS) Hire-Purchase Act 1959 s4; (VIC) Hire-Purchase Act 1959 s2.
[69] Section 2(5) and (6). An
agreement is deemed to be a hire purchase agreement where it is a condition of
the agreement to sell goods at retail that the buyer grants security over the
goods to the seller for the purchase price and the property passes subject to
that condition. In addition, where any person lends money upon the security of
any goods that have been bought or are to be bought at retail, the sale and the
loan are deemed to be a hire purchase agreement if (a) the purchase price is to
be paid out of the proceeds of the loan; and (b) the loan is either made by the
seller, or arranged by the seller and made by a person who is engaged in the
business of lending money or who habitually lends money in the course of his
business.
[70] John
Mickleburgh, Consumer Protection, 1979, at 23.
[71] R M Goode, Introduction
to Consumer Credit Act 1974, 1974, at para 3.40. Professor Francis Bennion
is, however, of the view that the definition in the 1973 Act cannot be wider
than that in the Hire-Purchase Act 1965. The latter covered every bailment
agreement under which “the property in the goods ... may pass to the
bailee”.
[72] [1954] 2 QB
35.
[73] John Mickleburgh, Consumer Protection, 1979, at 23 and R M Goode, Introduction to Consumer Credit Act 1974, 1974, at para 3.40.
[74] This Latin maxim means that one cannot give what he does not have: a seller cannot give the buyer any better title than he himself has.
[75] In a fax dated 18 May 1999 from Sir Roy Goode to the Secretary of the Sub-committee.
[76] Francis Bennion, Consumer Credit Control, Vol. 1 at 1104[1], now edited by Paul Dobson.
[77] In a telephone conversation on 30 April 1999 with the Secretary of the Sub-committee which was recorded in a letter from the Secretary to Sir Roy Goode dated 22 June 1999.
[78] In an e-mail dated 30 April 1999 to the Secretary of the Sub-committee.
[79] In an e-mail dated 8 May
1999 to the Secretary of the
Sub-committee.
[80] [1893] 2 QB
318.
[81] [1895] AC
471.
[82] [1997] 4 All ER
90.
[83] [1997] 4 All ER 90, at 98. The court left open the question whether contracts which required a "hirer" to pay all instalments (ie no right to terminate during the hiring period) and to exercise a positive option to acquire title for a nominal payment, also constituted conditional sale agreements. But as mentioned above, it was held in Close Asset Finance Ltd v Care Graphics Machinery Ltd (Times L R 21 March 2000) that such an agreement was not an agreement to buy.
[84] Francis Bennion, Consumer Credit Control, Vol 1 at 1104[1], now edited by Paul Dobson.
[85] In a fax dated 18 May 1999 from Sir Roy Goode to the Secretary of the Sub-committee.
[86] In a fax dated 18 May 1999 from Sir Roy Goode to the Secretary of the Sub-committee.
[87] The other criteria in the definition should also be fulfilled in order to be a hire purchase agreement.
[88] In a fax dated 18 May 1999 from Sir Roy Goode to the Secretary of the Sub-committee. For example, he mentioned that subparagraphs (ii) and (iii) could be replaced by the simpler phrase "the fulfilling of the conditions specified in the agreement". (In a telephone conversation on 30 April 1999 with the Secretary of the Sub-committee which was recorded in a letter from the Secretary to Sir Roy Goode dated 22 June 1999.)
[89] In a fax dated 18 May 1999 from Sir Roy Goode to the Secretary of the Sub-committee.
[90] John Goldring, Laurence Maher and Jill McKeough, Consumer Protection Law in Australia, 3rd Ed, 1987, at para 217.
[91] In The New Shorter
Oxford English Dictionary (Thumb Index Edition), "hardware" is defined as
"the physical components of a computer" and "software" is defined as "the
programs and other operating information used by a
computer".
[92] [1983] 2 NSWLR
48.
[93] Above, at
54
[94] [1996] 4 All ER
481.
[95] At
493.
[96] [1996] 4 All ER 481,
at 487.
[97] [1996] 4 All ER
481, at 493.
[98] Advent
Systems Ltd v Unisys Corp (1991) 925 F 2d
670.
[99] (1991) 925 F 2d 670,
at 675-676.
[100] (1990) 27
FCR 460.
[101] Above, at
paragraph 20
[102] However, it must be noted that according to Henry Carr and Richard Arnold, a compact disc of music can be played in private without infringing copyright. Every time computer software is used, copyright of it will be infringed if the user is not licensed. Because whenever a computer software is used as it is run in a computer, copying has to take place since the software has to be copied internally by the computer. Such copying is a restricted act from the copyright point of view. Therefore, a user of a standard software must obtain a license before using it. The requirement of a license should not alter the fact that there is a contract of sale (supply) of goods (copy of computer software in physical medium) between the retailer and the customer which covers the physical medium and the electro-magnetic encoding of the program. This is similar to a sale (supply) of compact disc. The difference is that the customer of the compact disc can use it without a license, but the customer of the computer software requires a license to use it. See Carr & Arnold, Computer Software: Legal Protection in the United Kingdom, 2nd Ed, 1992, Chapter 8, at 144.
As to the relationship between a license and supply of the computer software, it was held in Beta Computers (Europe) Ltd v Adobe Systems (Europe) Ltd, 1996 SLT 604, that the supply of proprietary software for a price was a single contract, although it contained elements of nominate contracts such as sale and the grant of a license, and that it was an essential feature of the transaction that the supplier undertook to make available to the customer both the medium on which the program material was recorded and the right of access to and use of the software. Lord Penrose said at 609H: "it is in my opinion unacceptable to analyse the transaction in this case as if it were two separate transactions relating to the same subject matter. There is but one contract ...." See also Carr & Arnold, Computer Software: Legal Protection in the United Kingdom, 2nd Ed, 1992, Chapter 8, and B W Napier, "The Future of Information Technology Law", (1992) CLJ 46.
In the US, a "shrink-wrap licence" is adopted by which the terms of the licence are printed on the package and can be seen through clear plastic film. It is stated on the package that if the customer open the package, he is deemed to accept the terms of the licence. See Carr & Arnold, Computer Software: Legal Protection in the United Kingdom, 2nd Ed, 1992, para 8.2.2 for the legal problem of "shrink-wrap licence".
In Hong Kong, software is usually supplied with the terms of the licence appears on the screen of the computer when the customer tries to load the software onto his computer. The customer has to click "agree" before he can successfully load the software. For some software companies, like Microsoft, the customer can return the software for refund if he does not accept the terms of the license.
[103] The draft Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act of the United States is intended to provide a coherent contract law framework for analyzing a license, which has been the dominant contractual framework for commerce in computer information. It is a uniform commercial code for software licenses and other computer information transactions. Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code serves as both a model and a point of departure for the draft Act. The draft Act covers a variety of transactions, many of which take place solely between merchants. It governs access by non-consumers to sophisticated databases as well as distribution of software to the general public. The draft Act provides legal rules for agreements covering all kinds of computer information such as standard software licenses, contracts for the custom development of computer programs, licenses to access online databases and website user agreements. It consists of nine parts: General Provisions; Formation and Terms; Construction; Warranties; Transfer of interests and rights; Performance; Breach of Contract; Remedies and Miscellaneous Provisions. The draft Act is available at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/ucita01.htm> (last visit on 6 October 2001). The draft Act has been adopted in some states.
[104] In a telephone conversation on 29 Oct 1999 between Mr K M Li, Deputy Chief Executive of the Consumer Council and the Secretary for the Sub-committee.