The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong
Conditional Fees Sub-committee
Conditional Fees
This consultation paper can be found on the Internet at:
<http://www.hkreform.gov.hk>
September 2005
This Consultation Paper has been prepared by the Conditional Fees Sub-committee of the Law Reform Commission. It does not represent the final views of either the Sub-committee or the Law Reform Commission, and is circulated for comment and discussion only.
The Sub-committee would be grateful for comments on this Consultation Paper by 15 November 2005. All correspondence should be addressed to:
The Secretary
The Conditional Fees Sub-committee
The Law Reform Commission
20th Floor, Harcourt House
39 Gloucester Road
Wanchai
Hong Kong
Telephone: (852) 2528 0472
Fax: (852) 2865 2902
E-mail: hklrc@hkreform.gov.hk
It may be helpful for the Commission and the Sub-committee, either in discussion with others or in any subsequent report, to be able to refer to and attribute comments submitted in response to this Consultation Paper. Any request to treat all or part of a response in confidence will, of course, be respected, but if no such request is made, the Commission will assume that the response is not intended to be confidential.
It is the Commission’s usual practice to acknowledge by name in the final report anyone who responds to a consultation paper. If you do not wish such an acknowledgement, please say so in your response.
The Law Reform Commission
of Hong Kong
Sub-committee on
Conditional Fees
Consultation Paper
Conditional Fees
________________
CONTENTS
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Chapter |
Page |
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Preface |
1 |
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Terms of reference |
1 |
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The Sub-committee |
1 |
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What are conditional fees? |
2 |
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Terminology |
2 |
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Contingency fee, percentage fee, “no win, no fee” |
3 |
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Conditional fee, uplift fee, success fee |
3 |
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Speculative fee |
3 |
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Layout of this paper |
3 |
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1. The costs of litigation |
5 |
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Who pays for litigation? |
5 |
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Relevant costs rules in Hong Kong |
7 |
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Costs to follow the event - the costs indemnity rule |
7 |
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Bases of taxation in Hong Kong |
8 |
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Costs on the party and party basis |
8 |
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Costs on the common fund basis |
8 |
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Costs on the indemnity basis |
9 |
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Costs as between a solicitor and his own client |
9 |
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Costs on the trustee basis |
10 |
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Other costs aspects |
10 |
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Counsel’s fees |
10 |
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Costs of litigant in person |
11 |
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Legal aid as a source of finance for civil litigation |
11 |
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The merits test |
11 |
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The means test |
12 |
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Ordinary Legal Aid Scheme |
12 |
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Supplementary Legal Aid Scheme |
13 |
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Criminal Legal Aid |
14 |
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Provisions against conditional or contingency fee arrangements in Hong Kong |
15
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2. Contingency fee arrangements in the USA |
17 |
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Introduction |
17 |
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The percentage contingency fee |
18 |
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Other unique features of the American civil justice system |
20 |
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Costs do not follow the event |
20 |
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Trial by jury |
20 |
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Punitive damages |
20 |
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Specialised plaintiff bar |
21 |
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Precedents not binding |
21 |
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Discovery |
21 |
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Absence of legal aid |
22 |
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Class actions |
22 |
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Non-specific pleadings |
22 |
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Conclusion |
23 |
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3. Legislative changes in England concerning conditional fees |
24
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Introduction |
24 |
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Maintenance and champerty |
24 |
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Criminal Law Act 1967 |
25 |
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Solicitors Act 1974 |
27 |
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The Royal Commission on Legal Services 1979 |
27 |
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Green Paper on Contingency Fees 1989 |
27 |
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Risk of conflict of interest |
28 |
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The United States experience |
28 |
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Access to justice |
29 |
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Allowing the consumer to choose |
29 |
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Options set out in the 1989 Green Paper |
29 |
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Responses to the 1989 Green Paper |
30 |
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Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 |
30 |
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Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 1995 and Conditional Fee Agreements Order 1995 |
31
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After-the-event insurance |
33 |
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Counsel’s fees |
36 |
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Evaluation of conditional fee agreements in 1997 |
36 |
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Further reforms 1998 – 2000 |
37 |
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Consultation Paper on “Access to Justice with Conditional Fees” 1998 |
38
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Conditional Fee Agreements Order 1998 |
38 |
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Access to Justice Act 1999 |
39 |
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The Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 2000 |
41 |
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General requirements |
42 |
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Conditional fee agreements with a success fee |
42 |
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Information which must be given to a client before making a conditional fee agreement |
43
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Collective Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 2000 |
44 |
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The Civil Procedure (Amendment No 4) Rules 2003 – Fixed costs |
45 |
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Conditional Fee Agreements (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2003 |
46
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Possible further legislative changes |
47 |
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DCA Consultation Paper June 2003 |
47 |
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Conditional Fee Agreements Forum 2003 |
48 |
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DCA Consultation Paper June 2004 |
48 |
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The use of conditional fee agreements in England |
52 |
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The future of conditional fee agreements |
53 |
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4. Problems and litigation in England |
55 |
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Introduction |
55 |
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Litigation on the recoverability of success fees and insurance premiums |
55
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Callery v Gray |
55 |
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The jurisdiction issue |
56 |
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The prematurity issue |
56 |
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Court of Appeal decision |
57 |
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Government policy |
57 |
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Policy and practical considerations |
57 |
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The House of Lords decision |
59 |
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Reasonableness of the success fee |
61 |
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Court of Appeal decision |
61 |
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Two-stage success fee |
62 |
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House of Lords decision |
62 |
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Reasonableness of the ATE premium |
64 |
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Court of Appeal decision |
64 |
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House of Lords decision |
64 |
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Comments on Callery v Gray |
65 |
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Halloran v Delaney – from 20% success fee to 5% |
65 |
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Comments on Halloran v Delaney |
66 |
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The effect of BTE insurance on the recoverability of ATE premiums |
67 |
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Sarwar v Alam – 2001 |
67 |
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Sarwar v Alam – 2003 |
69 |
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Re Claims Direct Test Cases |
70 |
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The position of event-triggered fees at common law and problems with the costs indemnity rule |
71
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British Waterways Board v Norman |
71 |
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The indemnity rule |
72 |
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Public policy |
72 |
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Aratra Potato Co Ltd v Taylor Joynson Garrett |
74 |
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Thai Trading Co v Taylor |
74 |
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Legislation and rules |
75 |
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Differentiating maintenance and champerty |
76 |
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Changing public policy |
77 |
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Absence of implied contract as to costs |
78 |
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Conclusion |
79 |
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Bevan Ashford v Yeandle Ltd |
79 |
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Post Thai Trading Co and Bevan Ashford decisions |
80 |
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Cases not following Thai Trading Co |
80 |
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Hughes v Kingston-upon-Hull City Council |
80 |
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Awwad v Geraghty & Co |
81 |
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Claims intermediaries |
82 |
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English v Clipson |
82 |
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The scope of application of section 58 of the Court and Legal Services Act 1990 |
85
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R (Factortame Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions (No 8) |
85
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Hollins v Russell |
86 |
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Spencer v Wood |
87 |
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King v Telegraph Group Ltd |
88 |
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Atack v Lee and Ellerton v Harris |
89 |
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Summary of main issues |
90 |
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5. Event-triggered fees in other jurisdictions |
93 |
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Introduction |
93 |
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Australian jurisdictions |
93 |
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Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Justice – A review of the federal civil justice system 2000 |
93
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Magic Menu Systems Pty Ltd v AFA Facilitation Pty Ltd |
96 |
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Smits v Roach |
97 |
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The Attorney General’s Department – The Justice Statement 1995 |
98
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The Law Institute of Victoria, Funding Litigation: The Contingency Fee Option, July 1989 |
98
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Legal Practice Act 1996, Victoria |
99 |
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Comments of the Law Institute of Victoria |
101 |
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Legal Profession Act 1987, New South Wales |
101 |
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Legal expenses insurance in Australia |
103 |
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Group insurance |
104 |
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Canadian jurisdictions |
105 |
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Ontario |
106 |
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Joint Committee’s proposed regulatory scheme |
106 |
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Ireland |
108 |
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Mainland China |
108 |
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Northern Ireland |
108 |
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Scotland |
109 |
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South Africa |
109 |
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6. Arguments for and against conditional fees and related issues |
113
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Introduction |
113 |
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Lord Chancellor’s Department’s Green Paper on Contingency Fees 1989 |
113 |
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South African Law Commission’s Report on Speculative and Contingency Fees 1996 |
116
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Conclusions of the SALC |
118 |
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Contingency or conditional fees |
119 |
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Criticisms of the American contingency fee |
119 |
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Frivolous litigation |
119 |
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Conflict of interest |
120 |
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Excessive fees |
121 |
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Advantages of conditional fees |
122 |
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Frivolous litigation |
122 |
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Conflict of interest |
122 |
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Excessive fees |
122 |
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The English Court of Appeal in Awwad v Geraghty & Co – pros and cons of conditional normal fee agreements |
123
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Other criticisms of conditional fee agreements |
125 |
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Other issues to be considered |
126 |
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Counsel |
126 |
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Insurance |
129 |
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Intermediaries |
129 |
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Regulation of claims intermediaries in England |
131 |
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Mode of operation of claims intermediaries in Hong Kong |
131 |
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Relevant regulations and rules |
132 |
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Pros and cons |
133 |
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The impact of allowing legal practitioners to charge event-triggered fees on claims intermediaries |
134
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The Hong Kong situation |
134 |
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Access to the courts |
134 |
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Why people are unrepresented |
135 |
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Impact of unrepresented litigants |
135 |
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Additional arguments for and against event-triggered fees in Hong Kong |
137
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Issues for consideration |
139 |
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7. Proposals for reform |
140 |
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Should we allow conditional fees? |
140 |
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Types of cases for conditional fee agreements |
141 |
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Recoverability of insurance premium and success fee from the unsuccessful party |
142
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Methods/criteria for fixing the success fee |
144 |
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Capping the success fee |
146 |
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Safeguards to protect defendants from nuisance claims |
147 |
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Simple conditional fee agreements |
148 |
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Policing the legal profession |
149 |
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Collective conditional fee agreements |
150 |
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Types of event-triggered fees to be validated |
151 |
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Insurance |
153 |
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Expansion of SLAS |
154 |
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Setting up of a privately-run contingency legal aid fund |
154 |
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Observations |
157 |
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Conclusion |
157 |
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8. Summary of recommendations |
158 |
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1. In May 2003, the Secretary for Justice and the Chief Justice directed the Law Reform Commission:
“To consider whether in the circumstances of Hong Kong conditional fee arrangements are feasible and should be permitted for civil cases and, if so, to what extent (including for what types of cases and the features and limitations of any such arrangements) and to recommend such changes in the law as may be thought appropriate.”
2. The Sub-committee on Conditional Fees was appointed in July 2003 to consider and advise on the present state of the law and to make proposals for reform. The sub-committee members are:
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Prof Edward K Y Chen, GBS, CBE, JP (Chairman) |
President Lingnan University
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Mr William H P Chan |
Deputy Director Legal Aid Department
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Mrs Pamela W S Chan, BBS, JP |
Chief Executive Consumer Council
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Mr Andrew Jeffries |
Partner Allen & Overy, Solicitors
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Mr Raymond Leung Hai-ming |
Chief Executive Officer C & L Investment Company Ltd
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Mr Raymond Leung Wai-man |
Barrister Temple Chambers
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Mr Kenneth S Y Ng |
Head of Legal and Compliance Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
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Mr Peter Schelling (from February 2004 to June 2005)
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Managing Director & CEO Zurich Insurance Group (Hong Kong)
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Mr Michael Scott
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Senior Assistant Solicitor General Department of Justice
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Mr Paul W T Shieh, SC |
Senior Counsel Temple Chambers
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Ms Sylvia W Y Siu |
Consultant Solicitor Sit, Fung, Kwong & Shum
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Ms Alice To Siu-kwan (from September 2003 to February 2004) |
Assistant General Manager Technical Underwriting & Claims Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance (HK) Ltd
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The Hon Madam Justice Yuen, JA |
Justice of Appeal High Court
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Ms Cathy Wan (Secretary)
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Senior Government Counsel Law Reform Commission
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3. The Sub-committee considered the reference over the course of nine meetings since July 2003 and will hold further meetings to discuss and evaluate comments on this consultation paper.
4. A conditional or contingency fee agreement can be described as an agreement between a legal practitioner and his or her client to the effect that the legal practitioner will charge no fees if the client’s court case is conducted unsuccessfully. The fees charged under this type of agreement are sometimes referred to as “event-triggered fees”, and the basis for charging legal costs is known as “no success, no pay” or “no win, no fee”. This type of fee arrangement is usually allowed only in civil litigation cases, although the scope of application differs amongst jurisdictions. In most jurisdictions, the costs indemnity rule applies, meaning that the unsuccessful party has to pay the costs of the successful party. Conditional or contingency agreements do not relieve the litigant from the risk of an adverse costs order to pay the other side’s legal costs if the litigation is unsuccessful.
5. There are various ways in which event-triggered fees can be applied, and the amount of fees that become payable in the event of success will vary accordingly. Terms used to denote these different methods of charging include contingency fees, uplift fees, speculative fees, and percentage fees. These terms are not consistently applied in the literature on the topic. For the purposes of this paper, these terms have the meaning ascribed to them below.
6. In some literature1 the term “contingency fee” is given a wide meaning and includes any type of calculation on a “no win, no fee” basis. However, in other contexts, “contingency fee” is taken to mean “percentage fee”, whereby the lawyer’s fee is calculated as a percentage of the amount awarded by the court. This is the basis adopted in the USA. For the purposes of this paper, we use the term “contingency fees” to mean only “percentage fees”, whereas the term “event-triggered fees” embraces all the different “no win, no fee” bases of calculation.
7. The term “conditional fee” is sometimes loosely used to mean event-triggered fees. However, in other contexts, and also for the purposes of this paper, “conditional fee” means an arrangement whereby, in the event of success, the lawyer charges his usual fee plus an agreed flat amount or percentage “uplift” on the usual fee. The additional fee is often referred to as an “uplift fee” or a “success fee”. Conditional fee agreements have been allowed in the UK since 1995, and also in the Australian jurisdictions of Victoria, South Australia, New South Wales and Queensland.
8. Where a “speculative fee” is charged, the lawyer is entitled to charge only his or her normal fee in the event of successful litigation. Where the action does not succeed, the lawyer is not entitled to a fee. Speculative fees have been used in Scotland for a long time.
9. The first chapter sets out the sources of litigation finance in Hong Kong, and the rules which apply to the allocation of costs. Chapter 2 examines the application of contingency fees in the USA, while Chapters 3 and 4 look at the development of conditional fees in England and recent problems and litigation there. Chapter 5 turns to the experience of event-triggered fees in a number of other jurisdictions, and Chapter 6 deals with the arguments for and against conditional fees and sets out related issues for discussion. The Sub-committee’s recommendations are set out in Chapter 7, while Chapter 8 contains a summary of the recommendations.
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1.1 The costs of litigation in courts and tribunals are met from a number of different sources. The principal sources of finance for litigation are discussed below.2
1.2 Insurance – Insurance companies are major participants in litigation, particularly in personal injury cases, where the dispute usually concerns the amount of damages rather than liability. In cases where the courts order the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s costs pursuant to the cost indemnity rule,3 these costs are often paid by the defendant’s insurance company in accordance with the insurance policy. In some jurisdictions, litigation costs are paid out of legal expense insurance schemes. These are common in Europe and in the United States, and growing in number in Canada and the United Kingdom.4 In Sweden, for example, legal expense insurance was introduced in 1961 and is now an obligatory part of householders’ comprehensive insurance. It is reported that 70% of Sweden’s population is protected by legal expense insurance, and 84% of total litigation costs are paid out of insurance. Such schemes provide cover to individuals for the costs of litigation in the courts (but not tribunals) in relation to disputes that arise in their everyday relations, except for divorce proceedings and disputes arising from an occupation for gain other than regular work.5 The cover indemnifies the litigant for his own costs and the costs of the other party that the litigant might be required to pay.6
1.3 Legal aid – The Legal Aid Department in Hong Kong provides assistance to litigants who satisfy the relevant means and merits tests, if their type of case is covered by the legal aid schemes.7 The legal aid schemes cover both criminal and civil cases, the latter mainly in relation to matrimonial disputes, personal injury and running-down cases. In 2003, 21,643 applications for civil legal aid were received and 10,694 of them were granted. The Legal Aid Department’s expenditure on civil cases was $343 million that year, and $769 million was recovered for the aided persons. As for criminal legal aid, the same year recorded 4,411 applications, with 2,803 of them granted, for an expenditure of $89 million.8
1.4 Tax deductions – The Australian Law Reform Commission9 pointed out that businesses are major users of the court system, and that legal expenses incurred are generally tax deductible. The ALRC’s consultation exercise revealed that many people saw the tax deductions available to business litigants as inherently inequitable because they were not also available to individual litigants. The business litigant who does not have to bear the full cost of litigation can therefore afford to engage more readily in litigation, to prolong the litigation, and to hire more expensive representation. Individuals who qualify for legal aid must undergo a strict merits and means test, whereas business litigants are eligible for tax deductions without any assessment of the merit or reasonableness of the legal expense.10
1.5 Legal practitioners – In jurisdictions which allow event-triggered fees, the litigation costs of unsuccessful cases are borne by the legal practitioners. The level of utilisation of contingency or conditional fees differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The Australian Law Reform Commission observed11 that in Australia speculative and contingency fee arrangements are commonly used by plaintiffs’ lawyers in personal injury cases. They are also used, although less frequently, for other claims for damages. Occasionally they are used where non-monetary relief, such as a declaration or injunction, is sought. In Scotland, by contrast, it is estimated that only about 1% of all cases are charged on a speculative basis.12 As for the United States, in the absence of legal aid, contingency fees are one of the principal sources of financing for litigation.
1.6 Claims Intermediaries – These are businesses run by non-legally qualified persons that help clients handle their compensation claims, usually those arising from traffic or work-related accidents. They operate on a “no win, no fee” basis, and usually require payment of 20% – 30% of the compensation received if the claim is successful. Claims intermediaries have proliferated in England, and are operating in Hong Kong. Given that the common law offences of maintenance and champerty are still applicable to Hong Kong, in some circumstances the activities of some compensation claims agents might be unlawful. Those claims intermediaries who act within the law offer a convenient service to the public, although the public should be aware that these agents are un-regulated. This issue will be discussed in greater detail later in this paper.
1.7 Litigants – The parties’ own resources are the most obvious source of finance for litigation. The costs rules determine which litigant shall pay how much, and the basis for determination of costs.
1.8 To assess the impact of the introduction of any event-triggered fees in Hong Kong, it is useful to set out an overview of the relevant costs rules. The word “costs” is sometimes used to denote the remuneration which a party pays to his own solicitor. It also means the sum of money which the court orders one litigant to pay to another to compensate the latter for the expense which he has incurred in